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Freedom at the fringes? Slave flight and empire-building
in the early modern Spanish borderlands of Essequibo–
Venezuela and Louisiana–Texas
Bram Hoonhout and Thomas Mareite
ABSTRACT
In spaces of contested sovereignty, self-emancipated slaves
exploited imperial rivalries to attain freedom, based on the
Spanish religious sanctuary. However, the status of foreign
escaped slaves always remained subject to issues of empire-
building. This article focuses on fugitive slaves from the Dutch
colony of Essequibo and territorial Louisiana looking for
freedom at the southern and northern borderlands of the
Spanish empire, respectively, in Venezuela and Texas. In the
former, increased Spanish control over the borderland created
more opportunities for ‘runaways’. In the latter, improvisation
led to erratic policies, related to pressure from US planters.
Introduction
As early modern European empires pushed their territorial claims further in the
Americas, their agents came into contact with indigenous groups as well as with
other Europeans. These moments of contact could result in war, commercial
cooperation and various other forms of coexistence. When territorial claims
clashed, the result was the creation of a borderland, otherwise known as
border zone, contact zone, middle ground or zone of entanglement.1
In these areas of contested sovereignty, empires were porous, and so were
their regimes of slavery. Enslaved people could try to cross borders in order
to escape bondage, and the Spanish empire in particular encouraged such
flight, promising freedom to fugitives from Protestant empires. Here, slavery
and empire-building interacted with each other. In a competition over scarce
labour, it was beneficial to try and draw workers from another empire to the
Spanish side. Besides undermining the enemy’s economic base, it could also
cause potential unrest in their system of plantation slavery. Offering freedom
to fugitives was thus a useful tactic for the Spanish, but only as long as it
could be reconciled with other imperial interests.
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This Spanish sanctuary policy started as a patchwork of local provisions and
grew more extensive over time.2 It began with the island of Trinidad in 1680,
Florida in 1693 and Venezuela in 1704. Freedom for enslaved fugitives was
usually conditioned on their conversion to Roman Catholicism. On 24 Septem-
ber 1750, this policy was extended by a Royal Decree to the entire American
empire (and confirmed once more in 1789), stating that slaves from Protestant
empires would be declared free in Spanish domains on conversion to Catholi-
cism. While enslaved people had fled to Spanish areas before, this declaration
offered better prospects for the enslaved. Instead of having to rely on informal
freedom – freedom in hiding, with the fear they might be discovered and
returned to their former masters – the enslaved could now aspire to formal
freedom: being declared free according to law.3
However, the exact implementation of this policy was subject to local power
dynamics. In general, Spanish officials had a significant amount of authority to
adjust official policy to local conditions and such flexibility contributed to the
effective governance of the empire.4 This room for improvisation was of great
importance in border zones, where governors had to navigate between multiple
interests: complying with royal orders, securing supplies from neighbours,
defending the empire, expanding the empire and preventing escalation that
might trigger war.
The implication is that empire-building in the Spanish American borderlands
was to a large extent improvised on the ground rather than designed in the
metropolis. Tamar Herzog recently demonstrated how borders in Iberian
America were not simply created by treaties and wars but arose out of the activi-
ties of agents on the ground.5 In fact, peace-time interactions could prove more
influential than military confrontations because of the centrality of claim-
making. Encroachment during peace-time would strengthen an imperial claim
on the land, as long as no opposition was encountered. Furthermore, the
relationship with native American populations was often crucial, as indigenous
communities could either be barriers to expansion or allies in extending territor-
ial claims.
To analyse such borderland dynamics, we will rely on the distinction – made
by Jeremy Adelman and Stephon Aron – between ‘borderlands’ and ‘bordered
lands’.6 Borderlands are defined as ‘contested boundaries between colonial
domains’. From the eighteenth century onwards these were increasingly
turned into ‘bordered lands’, when international treaties between nation states
established clear border lines.7 In both our cases, the transition from borderland
to bordered land was in process but far from completed. This begs the question
how this transition process affected fugitive slaves, and whether their opportu-
nities to attain freedom increased or decreased.
The relationship between slave resistance and inter-imperial relations in the
early modern Spanish borderlands has been discussed for several places. This
development marks a shift from the literature of the 1970s–1980s, when
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studies on slave flight largely focused on classic ‘maroons’, that is, on escaped
slaves forming communities within the limits of colonial empires, though
usually at their geographical edges.8 Recently, however, historians have turned
towards border regions. Linda Rupert has analysed the close connections
between mainland Spanish America and the Dutch island of Curaçao. Many
enslaved Africans managed to cross the short distance to apply for freedom in
Coro (Venezuela), either through flight or as sailors. Carrying ‘temporary man-
umission papers’, they were able to work in the lively border zone trade but
could also desert once on Spanish ground.9 Another maritime border zone
was located between the Danish Virgin Islands and Spanish Puerto Rico.10
Yet, the northern borderlands of Spanish Florida remain the most analysed
case study, especially through Jane Landers’ work. The peninsula became a
free-soil area as early as 1693, hurting the interests of British planters in the
North American colonies. While it indeed led to the establishment of sizeable
communities of escaped slaves, the Spanish empire eventually ‘temporarily
revoked’ such asylum in 1790. Pressure by the British colonies of North
America and the fear of revolutionary contamination following the French revo-
lution led to a suspension of the sanctuary policy.11 Finally, other scholars have
looked at slaves absconding across clear borders, towards free states.12 This
article seeks to contribute to this scholarship by looking at less clearly delineated
borders, investigating the southern and northern border zones of the Spanish
empire.
At these fringes, Spanish claims were confronted by similar claims by the
Dutch and the United States. In the south, a contact zone was formed in the
area connecting modern-day Venezuela and Guyana, with the Spanish settling
along the Orinoco River and the Dutch along the Essequibo River (see
Map 1). This border zone emerged during the seventeenth century but
became more important in the eighteenth century. Spanish missionaries
started to extend their territorial claims further towards the Dutch side, where
an increased number of enslaved Africans viewed fleeing to the Spanish as a
way out of bondage. In the north, the contact zone ran along the Sabine
River, separating Spanish Texas and the territory of Orleans (becoming the
state of Louisiana from 1812 onwards) acquired by the US in 1803 (see
Map 3). This borderland emerged for the most part in the early eighteenth
century, with the gradual development of French colonisation and related intro-
duction of slaves in Louisiana in the first third of the eighteenth century. At the
same time, Spain gradually established a sparse military and civilian presence on
the eastern fringes of Texas. Afterwards, between 1762 and 1803 Louisiana was
integrated in the Spanish empire. Its acquisition by the US provided an unpre-
cedented impulse to the expansion of cotton and sugar production in the Mis-
sissippi delta region, bringing numerous enslaved newcomers to the territory.13
By looking at both borderlands, this article sheds light on a remarkable form
of slave resistance, while also paying attention to the precarious nature of seeking
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freedom across the border. In both cases, local improvisation and negotiation
were often more important than official decrees, while escaped slaves’ rights
were used as bargaining chips in the rivalry between different empires. Fugitive
slaves turned imperial competition to their advantage by illegally switching jur-
isdictions. However, in both these contact zones, self-liberated slaves were as
much the collateral victims of imperial rivalries as their beneficiaries, as their
status was always conditioned by constantly evolving balances of power in the
Map 1. The borderland between the Orinoco and Essequibo rivers, overlaid with the modern-
day borders and showing Dutch outposts.
4 B. HOONHOUT AND T. MAREITE
borderlands. Exploring this line of investigation will contribute to a more
complex understanding of processes of ‘grand marronage’ (a permanent disap-
pearance and settlement beyond the master’s control) as opposed to ‘petit mar-
ronage’ (a temporary absence) – beyond the restrictive prism of national
borders.14
The first part of this article analyses the case of the Venezuela-Essequibo bor-
derland, with a broad look at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The
second part focuses on the Texas–Louisiana borderland from 1803 to 1812,
the period spanning from Louisiana’s purchase by the US to its admission as
a US state. The final part draws conclusions from the comparison.
Amerindians and enslaved Africans in the Essequibo–Venezuela
borderland
The Essequibo–Venezuela borderland actually remains contested today, but the
contact zone emerged during the seventeenth century.15 In that period, the
Dutch and the Spanish colonial presences were weak and the many indigenous
groups (with an estimated population of 100,000) controlled the borderland.16
The English, under Sir Walter Raleigh, were trying to find El Dorado and the
Dutch, establishing themselves in 1616, were still fighting a war of independence
against their arch enemy, Spain. In the first half of the seventeenth century,
various coalitions of English, Dutch and different Amerindian groups would
attack and destroy the main Spanish settlement, Santo Tomé, multiple times.
However, the settlement was rebuilt every time (see Map 1). By 1648, open
warfare ended, as Spain recognised the Dutch presence in the region in the
peace treaty of Münster. For a decade, the Spanish and the Dutch even main-
tained peaceful trade relations, as they benefited from each other’s support. In
violation of Spanish decrees, local governors found it opportune to condone
trade with the Dutch to their mutual advantage.17
By the seventeenth century, plantation slavery had not yet played a large role.
The Spanish part of the Guiana region (Venezuela) represented only a peripheral
part of the empire. On the Dutch side, the West India Company (WIC), which
administered the colony of Essequibo, operated several plantations, but it was
mostly preoccupied with the trade in foodstuffs, hammocks and particularly
annatto (a food colorant and condiment).18 In addition, the Dutch also traded
in so-called ‘red slaves’ – enslaved Amerindians – to use them in small
numbers on plantations, for fishing, hunting or growing cassava.19 These
enslaved Amerindians came from the Spanish hinterland, where they were cap-
tured by Carib slavers (sometimes together with Dutchmen) who transported
the captives across the borderland to sell them to the Dutch.20
Understandably, these slave raids were a major source of friction in the
region. Under Spanish law, all indigenous people were royal subjects and there-
fore could not be slaves.21 In 1686, the Dutch also declared the four main
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Amerindian groups living nearby exempt from slavery (the Arawak [Lokono],
Akawaio, Warao and Caribs [Kalina]). However, the Dutch continued to buy
people from other groups who had been carried as slaves from the Orinoco
region by the Caribs.22 As a result, tensions between Spaniards and Carib
groups increased, with the latter seeking closer contact with the Dutch.
In the meantime, the Spanish settlers also had conflicts with other Amerin-
dian groups living in their vicinity. They tried to gain more control over their
immediate surroundings by resettling Amerindian groups in missionary villages,
the so-called reducciones. During the seventeenth century, many indigenous
people successfully resisted this imposed way of life. Yet the situation changed
after the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1713) which led to a new
attempt to expand the empire. In 1728, the Real Compañía Guipuzcoana de
Caracas (the Caracas Company) was founded to stimulate the expansion of
the tobacco sector.23 Additionally, more settlers and soldiers were sent as well
as missionaries. Consequently, after 1732 the number of missionary villages stea-
dily increased, stimulated by competition among the three religious orders
involved: the Jesuits of Santa Fé, the Franciscans of Piritu and the Capuchins
of Trinidad.24
In the first part of the eighteenth century, the number of people fleeing from
the Dutch to the Spanish side had started to increase. For instance, 23 ‘red slaves’
fled from Pieter la Rivière’s plantation to Orinoco in 1726. When his son went to
reclaim the enslaved Amerindians the following year, his vessel was intercepted
by the Spanish – as he was also smuggling – and he was killed.25 However, in
general, enslaved Amerindians did not flock to the Spanish in great numbers,
possibly because they were likely to end up in a missionary village, if they
even managed to traverse the Carib territory in between. In parallel, the
number of African ‘runaways’ increased markedly in the 1720s.26 The Dutch
plantation sector, while still in its infancy, had grown significantly and by
1735 there were 30 plantations in Essequibo.27 Consequently, the number of
people who tried to escape bondage by running towards Orinoco increased
further.
The Dutch tried to retrieve the absconders. In 1729, they issued a proclama-
tion of amnesty for those that had fled to Orinoco. Seeing that it had no effect,
the pardon was extended to October 1730, after which the ‘deserters’ would be
heavily punished.28 Previously, the Dutch commandeur (the head of the colonial
government) had made contact with the Spanish governor of Trinidad and
Orinoco, soliciting his permission to get their enslaved Africans back, as the
colonists’ previous attempts to reclaim their slaves had failed. The commandeur
indicated that he would send the complaint to Madrid, via the Dutch Republic,
as he had no other means of pressure.29
While the effect of this particular request is unclear, a form of cooperation
developed afterwards. The two European powers still needed each other’s
support, so there was some room for negotiation: Dutch authorities connived
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at illicit Spanish trading voyages coming to Essequibo, while the Spanish, albeit
refusing to deliver ‘runaways’, were willing to offer financial compensation to the
Dutch by sending them part of the proceeds of the frequent sale of fugitive slaves
into the local slave market. This way, inter-imperial relations were fostered on
the back of ‘runaway’ slaves. The Dutch were quite content with this system,
since they sometimes received more than the value they placed on the
runaway slaves themselves.30
In 1749, the Dutch even attempted to establish a ‘cartel’ – an agreement to
return each other’s ‘runaways’. The Spanish had little to gain from such a
deal, considering that there were hardly any deserters from the Spanish to the
Dutch side. The Spanish governor, by then in Cumaná, nevertheless expressed
a willingness to be a good neighbour. However, the plan apparently failed
because the Spanish demanded that the Dutch deliver any deserters in person,
while they, in turn, would offer only monetary compensation.31 While this
idea of a cartel resurfaced several times in the following decades, it was only
in 1791 that it actually materialised.
In fact, the borderland balance changed dramatically after mid-century, as
several developments came together. Firstly, the Spanish declared a free-soil
policy in 1750 for fugitives from the Dutch side who were willing to become
Catholics. This must have made absconding much more attractive for the
enslaved in Essequibo. Another parallel development was the growth of a
Dutch plantation sector (particularly from the 1760s onwards), boosted by a
system of plantation mortgages.32 Finally, the Spanish had succeeded in bringing
their immediate surroundings under control and were now pushing further into
the borderland.33
In this process, locally improvised decisions were clearly the most important
for the Spanish. In 1754 and 1759 – in clear violation of the sanctuary policy –
Spanish authorities were still delivering the proceeds of re-sold ‘runaways’ to the
Dutch.34 During the 1760s, this cooperation stopped. The Dutch Director-
General believed the ‘runaways’ were still sold back into slavery, with the only
change that the Spanish commandants now pocketed the money themselves.35
Unfortunately, the fate of the ‘runaways’ remains unclear.36 It seems that
some people ended up in the missionary villages among the Amerindians,
where they might perhaps be legally free, but were still subjected to a forced
labour regime.37 Several Capuchin fathers at least testified that some fugitives
were sold, but that converted people were all set free.38
Regardless, the decreased cooperation was part of a broader policy in which
the Spanish, by now on a stronger footing, became more confrontational
towards the Dutch and the Amerindians. Regarding the latter, the efforts to
subdue the Carib groups living in the borderland proved difficult, as they
were not willing to be re-settled in the missionary villages.39 In fact, they
fought back, destroying several Spanish missions in 1751 and 1752 and killing
the inhabitants.40 Feeling threatened, the Caribs turned for help towards their
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long-time trading partners, the Dutch. However, the Dutch authorities were
careful not to get embroiled in a conflict with the Spanish. Consequently,
Storm van ‘s Gravesande, the Director-General, noted how important it was
not give or sell guns to the Caribs and previously had tried to get Carib
leaders to abstain from the attacks.41
These conflicts centred on the Cuyuni River, which connected the two sides of
the borderland where many Carib groups lived. As Map 2 shows, the Cuyuni
also offered the best connection for fugitive slaves from the Dutch areas to the
Spanish – other routes went via the ocean, or via the coast, passing by a
Dutch post along the Moruka River. Consequently, the Dutch had established
an outpost along the Cuyuni River in 1755, partially to prevent any more
enslaved Africans from making their way to Orinoco. However, in 1758 a
Spanish raid destroyed the post, leaving the road wide open again. Furthermore,
the attack also led local Caribs to leave the area and settle elsewhere. Conse-
quently, Storm van ‘s Gravesande declared in 1762: ‘no negroes can get away
unless the Indians connive at their escape or unless they go over to the Spaniards,
which, since the occurrence at Cuyuni, can scarcely be prevented’. The post was
re-established further up the river in 1766 but seemed to have had little effect on
curbing desertion. Not only was the post in bad shape and routes around it
existed, but also the Caribs had vacated the area.42
Indeed, the Amerindians were the main recourse against ‘runaways’.43 A 1758
plan proposed that the planters from the civil militia pursue the fugitives, but
that proved ineffective. The whites were reluctant to go after the ‘runaways’,
especially in the dense rain forests.44 In contrast, for Amerindian groups,
chasing ‘runaways’ became an increasingly attractive way of acquiring European
goods.45 Their slave raiding expeditions in Spanish territory had become more
Map 2. The three main desertion routes from Essequibo to Venezuela.
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difficult due to the expansion of the missions, but as slave catchers the Caribs
became even more important to the Dutch. While relations with indigenous
people were certainly not always smooth, the WIC regularly underlined the
importance of maintaining good relations.46 Consequently, the Dutch were
alarmed at the retreat of the Caribs. Storm van ‘s Gravesande noted that in
1768, a Spanish raid in the Cuyuni area ‘when a large part of Indians were cap-
tured and taken away, has filled the rest with terror, and they are gradually
drawing off’.47 The Spanish, on the other hand, insisted they were just freeing
Amerindians enslaved under the Dutch.48 In 1769, two more Spanish missions
were established in the Cuyuni area, prompting van ‘s Gravesande to remark
fatalistically:
It is finished now, Your Honours; neither Postholders nor Posts are of any use now.
The slaves can now proceed at their ease to the Missions without fear of being
pursued, and we shall in a short time have entirely lost possession of the River
Cuyuni.49
With the Cuyuni route thus open to ‘runaways’, guarding the other routes
became more important. In 1760, a large conflict broke out on one of the
WIC’s own plantations. Two sugar cane mills had been burned and 15 persons
had deserted, and the authorities feared further escalation. They believed that
the insurgents would flee to Orinoco and therefore hired Carib forces to patrol
the coast to prevent them from taking the route via the Moruka River.50
However, in 1774, the Spanish also attacked the Moruka post, again causing the
local Amerindians to flee.51 The post would only be re-established 10 years
later, leaving fugitive slaves with the opportunity to escape in the meantime.52
With few means to stop desertion themselves, the Dutch again placed their
hopes in agreements with Spain. One option was sending people directly to
Orinoco. In 1776, a German man, Charles Teuffer, was sent to Angostura,
with the aim of reclaiming both black and ‘red’ slaves and with the offer of
paying any costs or ransom involved.53 However, like previous missions, it
proved expensive but also ineffective, as the Spanish governors refused to
cooperate.54 Channels in Europe constituted an alternative. The Dutch colonial
authorities repeatedly underlined the importance of a cartel to the WIC, urging
the States-General to conclude an agreement with Spain, but to no avail.55 In
1769, an official plea was sent to the Spanish court, but six years later it had
not yet received a reply.56 In fact, the Dutch ambassador in Madrid acknowl-
edged that a cartel was unlikely to materialise, considering that fugitive slaves
were only a problem for the Dutch.57
The scale of desertion is unfortunately impossible to determine since Spanish
sources are silent on the issue, and the Dutch archives do not provide a full
picture either. Officially, planters were obliged to notify the colonial government
when an enslaved person absconded, but they often did not.58 The seat of gov-
ernment could be several days sailing away, and there was little to gain for the
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planter. In fact, he might draw scorn from others as it signified he was a cruel
master.
Nevertheless, the rate of desertion was far frommarginal. It even took place in
groups of up to 30 people, although they were probably more likely to get caught.
Examples includes a plot of 20 people who tried to escape from the Director-
General’s own plantations, and a group of close to 30 that were caught in
1784 in a boat trying to get to Trinidad.59 There must have been more abscon-
ders from van ‘s Gravesande plantation, as he wrote to the WIC in 1772 that
several of his own slaves resided in Orinoco, besides seven fugitives from one
of the Company’s own plantations. Furthermore, he stated that ‘[t]hose belong-
ing to private colonists are innumerable. The numbers of ‘runaways’ increasing
daily, this matter will end in the total ruin of a great many plantations, unless
efficacious remedies be adopted’.60 His successor also remarked that ‘no week
passes’ without desertions, which would soon lead to the ‘total ruin’ of the
colony.61 Finally, the fear for further desertions was clearly manifest in the
repeated calls for a cartel, and in statements that Essequibo should beware of
ending up like a ‘second Surinam’ – where ‘runaways’ settled in the forest to
become an undefeatable counterforce to the plantation society.62
In this atmosphere, the role of Amerindian slave catchers only increased, and
so did their bargaining power. Both the Dutch and the Amerindians had an
incentive to renew their bonds each year. As the colonies were temporarily occu-
pied by the British and later the French during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War
(1780–1784), the Dutch afterwards felt the need to assert that they were still
important players.63 For the Amerindians, renewal could be beneficial as well,
as it meant they could come to the Dutch fort and demand presents and rum
in exchange for their promise to help in times of need.64 In addition, the Amer-
indians would also receive rewards if they retrieved a ‘runaway’, and by the 1780s
could even demand to have guns for the duration of the search.65 Finally, when
the British took over the colonies from the Dutch in 1796, they were oblivious of
these important alliances at first, but soon changed course and spent large
amounts on providing the desired ‘presents’.66
By then a cartel had been established as well: in 1791, in the Treaty of Ara-
njuez, Spain and the Dutch Republic promised to return each other’s deserters,
whether white or black. This agreement applied to all their American colonies.
Returned absconders would not be punished for their desertion or forced to
reverse a possible conversion.67 This treaty had become possible because of
the revolutionary developments around the Caribbean. Rather than an asset
or a way to harm rival powers, harbouring deserters now became a liability, as
they might be revolutionary instigators. This had already prompted the
Spanish empire to issue a ‘temporary’ revocation of its free-soil policy for
foreign fugitives in May 1790.
Yet it is doubtful how much effect this treaty had. In 1796, Essequibo (with
Demerara and Berbice) was taken over by Britain, which went to war with
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Spain in the same year, likely hindering cooperation. Furthermore, when the
colonies were briefly restored to the Dutch in 1802, the Dutch authorities
noted that the cartel did not help much: the procedures were expensive and
time-consuming.68 It is thus likely that the border zone continued to provide
opportunities for enslaved Africans who tried to escape slavery, as the transition
from borderland to bordered land was far from complete.69
Self-liberated slaves in territorial Louisiana and Spanish Texas
As in the Essequibo–Venezuela borderland, cross-border interactions proved
a clear challenge to processes of empire-building in the Louisiana–Texas bor-
derlands. Municipal archives and diplomatic records for northeastern New
Spain and the US Southwest regularly reveal the porousness of the boundaries
separating the state of Louisiana and Texas. This fluid border proved a recur-
ring source of conflict between the Spanish empire and the US in the years
following the Louisiana Purchase (1803). The Adams-Onís treaty (1819) con-
cluded between both states (and confirmed by independent Mexico in 1821)
provided the deceptive impression that a clear line had eventually been
reached along the Sabine River. But the treaty did not imply a smooth tran-
sition from borderlands to bordered lands, since the incipient Mexican state
proved powerless to stop countless illegal settlers, smugglers and fugitives
from entering. In this context, slaves absconded from Louisiana to Spanish
and Mexican Texas both before and after the specific period on which this
article focuses (1803–1812). Yet the existence of southern escape routes
from US slavery has been largely overshadowed by the historical focus on
northern escape routes. Furthermore, the growing recent literature on slave
flight from the US South to the northeastern borderlands of New Spain/
Mexico has largely focused on the four decades spanning Mexican indepen-
dence to the outbreak of the US Civil War, with a particular emphasis on the
Texas–Mexico borderlands from 1836 onwards.70 By contrast, the first third
of the nineteenth century has received far less scrutiny, and the interaction
between slave flight and state-building in the context of Louisiana–Texas bor-
derlands remains understudied.71
From the late seventeenth century onwards, the French empire settled in
‘Basse-Louisiane’ (corresponding vaguely to present-day Louisiana) and as
slaves were introduced in the province in the early eighteenth century,
escaped bondspeople took refuge in swamps, forests, among native Amerindian
populations and in incipient urban environments. They also occasionally
crossed the Sabine River (especially from the post of Natchitoches in northwes-
tern Louisiana) to Spanish Texas, in an attempt to reach freedom through grand
marronage. Nonetheless, no provision officially granted freedom to these fugi-
tives, as the Royal Decree of 1750 did not include escaped slaves from the
French possessions. Between 1762 and 1803 (the period of Spanish rule over
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Louisiana), slaves absconding from Louisiana to Texas were actively pursued by
Spanish administrators and sent back to their masters, at a time when large-scale
plantation agriculture developed in Louisiana, paving the way for the cotton and
sugar boom generated by its purchase by the US.72
As the first slaves from the US territory of Orleans (or territorial Louisiana)
started appearing after 1803 in Spanish Texas, local administrators wondered
about which piece of legislation should prevail. Was the ‘temporary’ free-soil
policy revocation of 1790 still in legal force, undermining the protective disposi-
tions of Carlos IV’s Royal Decree of 1789?Was it applicable to Texas at all? Were
foreign ‘runaways’ to be protected or not and, if so, under which terms? In July
1803, Nemesio Salcedo, the general commandant of the Eastern Internal Pro-
vinces (Provincias Internas de Oriente) decided to base his policy on the Royal
Decree of 1789, either ignoring or dismissing the Royal Order issued a year
later. The Spanish empire’s acceptance of foreign escaped slaves in eastern
Texas also stemmed from several practical motives. First, protecting fugitive
slaves from the US could weaken the rival’s fast-growing plantation slavery in
the Mississippi delta region, which was the cornerstone of US economic and pol-
itical westward expansion and thereby threatened Spanish sovereignty on
eastern Texas, where development had stagnated in the eighteenth century.
Second, as new settlers, ‘runaways’ from the US would contribute to the econ-
omic development of the borderlands and strengthen the demographic presence
of the empire in the province. This was important since migrants from the heart
of New Spain came in chronically insufficient numbers to the northeastern part
of the Viceroyalty.
Following Aron and Adelman’s terminology, the ‘borderland’ that stretched
between Natchitoches to Nacogdoches did not form a ‘bordered land’ yet
(Map 3). In the first decade of the nineteenth century, transgressors of national
laws could easily find refuge on either side of the Sabine River, especially given
that in 1806 a ‘neutral ground’ was constituted in part of the borderlands
(whereby no state could claim sovereignty) as the two governments could not
agree on clear boundaries. Army deserters from the US, for instance, regularly
absconded to the Spanish side, while frontier bandits, criminals, smugglers
and squatters soon inhabited this grey zone, accompanied at times by
‘runaway’ slaves.73 Apart from this quest for informal freedom, fugitive slaves
also attempted to gain formal freedom from the agents of the Spanish empire
in eastern Texas, and settled especially in the towns of Nacogdoches and Trini-
dad de Salcedo, employed mostly in cultivation work, stock raising and domestic
service.74
Nacogdoches (a town developed around the foundations of an old mission
established in 1716) represented the gateway to Spanish Texas. Its settlers main-
tained intense cross-cultural and economic ties with western Louisiana, eluding
restrictions set by the Spanish empire on trade with foreign powers. Comple-
menting agriculture and ranching, contraband trade (including with
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Amerindians) flourished along the Sabine River. As slave traders from New
Orleans and Natchez expanded their networks across the border, at the turn
of the nineteenth century Nacogdoches had twice as many slaves as the rest of
the province (enslaved African Americans numbering 56 out of 811 inhabitants
by 1805, apart from free blacks). Escaped slaves from Louisiana thus settled in a
small, albeit visible, black community.75 Further west, the villa of Trinidad de
Salcedo was founded in January 1806 with the purpose of settling an intermedi-
ary military and civilian post between San Antonio de Béxar, the province’s
capital, and Nacogdoches. It regularly received re-settled fugitive slaves from
the eastern fringes of Texas. In May 1808, comandante general Salcedo, for
instance, ordered the transfer of 27 escaped slaves from Nacogdoches to the
villa. This decision stemmed from a concern to de-escalate border tensions by
discouraging groups of US slave hunters and Amerindians dispatched to retrieve
fugitives.76
In Spanish Texas, Salcedo’s free-soil policy soon received its first challenge, as
the first groups of slaves began crossing the Sabine River. A posse led by tobacco
planter Alexis Cloutier from Natchitoches that was pursuing nine fugitives,
arrived at Nacogdoches on 23 October 1804, and threatened the Spanish military
commandant José Joaquín Ugarte to continue the search westward if
Map 3. The Texas–Louisiana borderland along the Sabine River after the Louisiana Purchase by
the US (1803).
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necessary.77 The military commandant in Natchitoches urged his counterpart to
act for the ‘good understanding’ of both nations. A former Spanish governor in
Louisiana also suggested returning the fugitives following the Royal Order of 17
May 1790, in the hope that the restitution would prevent border conflicts.78
Under pressure from diverse fronts, Ugarte on his own initiative ordered the
arrest of the escaped slaves. After a first unsuccessful search, two inhabitants
saw the fugitives along the Attoyac River, and a second expedition formed by
six soldiers was dispatched to arrest and deliver them to Cloutier.79 Once in
Natchitoches, some of the former absconders were confined in the town’s jail
(in particular fugitives who had stolen property from their masters), as accord-
ing to Claiborne ‘their liberation would give alarm to the good Citizens’.80
Ugarte’s improvised decision brought him into conflict with his superior,
comandante general Nemesio Salcedo, who disapproved of the restitution.
From Nacogdoches, Ugarte advocated ignoring the royal order of 1789, and
added that the restitution of fugitive slaves from Louisiana prior to its purchase
by the US in 1803 had been the custom. For Salcedo, by contrast, military com-
mandants in the frontier were to keep hold of foreign escaped slaves until receiv-
ing a clear resolution by the Spanish King on the subject.81 Ugarte’s arguments
did not convince Salcedo, and the following month, Dionisio Valle replaced him
and received strict orders not to return foreign ‘runaways’.82
Salcedo’s asylum policy stood firm during the following years. In January
1808, Salcedo (who was still waiting for orders from Spain and the Viceroy)
instructed Governor Antonio Cordero that the planned expulsion of undocu-
mented foreigners from eastern Texas did not ‘include nor ought to include
the negro slaves who present themselves in order to obtain their freedom’.83
An exception to the rule came in 1806. Eight slaves absconded from Opelousas
(western Louisiana) to Nacogdoches in the summer. Military commandant
Francisco Viana initially denied restitution to their master, yet the prospect of
fuelling an already tense geopolitical situation eventually prompted Nemesio
Salcedo to order their delivery.84
As Ugarte’s unilateral initiative and the latter example illustrate, whether or
not foreign escaped slaves were to receive amparo (protection) remained
closely tied to the evolving balance of power in the Texas–Louisiana borderlands
in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Securing the border along the
Sabine River and preserving the few settlements Spain had in eastern Texas
stood as the primary concern of the local colonial administrators. The protection
provided to foreign fugitive slaves could jeopardise the territorial integrity of the
Spanish empire in its northernmost province by encouraging illegal expeditions
launched to retrieve the ‘runaways’. Under pressure, Ugarte judged the situation
precarious and prioritised the maintenance of sovereignty and peace over shel-
tering fugitive slaves at the risk of antagonising neighbouring planters.
The frequent escape of slaves from western Louisiana to eastern Texas gener-
ated rising resentment among US planters. As early as the autumn of 1804,
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settlers in Natchitoches accused Ugarte of inciting their slaves to flee.85 The new
proximity of free-soil territories for lower Mississippi’s slaves, and a growing
uncertainty regarding the slave trade’s future in Louisiana (peaking with the
federal ban on slave importation to the US in 1807), fuelled this discomfort.86
In this context, slaveowners in Louisiana felt increasingly uncomfortable with
the frequent flight of their enslaved workforce beyond the Sabine River. For
instance, settlers in Opelousas grew extremely upset in June 1808 by the
escape of some slaves to Texas, according to governor Claiborne, and were
awaiting ‘with much impatience the interference of the General Government’
on the issue.87 With the number of fugitive slaves increasing, planters in Louisi-
ana oscillated between an adherence to legal solutions and the temptation of
informal means to retrieve their ‘property’. Over time, however, the planters
became increasingly assertive.
In early September 1807, three settlers from Natchitoches led by tobacco
planter François Rouquier petitioned the Spanish side with the assistance of
parish judge John C. Carr for the recovery of some slaves who had escaped
from their estates. The planters expressed confidence in reaching a legal agree-
ment, though they also hinted at resorting to force in case of the failure of the
negotiations. As Salcedo refused to grant the request, officials on both sides of
the Sabine River feared that ‘a force of 250 men’ might storm eastern Texas
searching for escaped slaves (though it remained merely a threat).88
When petitioning the Spanish officials did not work, Louisiana planters
turned to their own government. From the autumn of 1807 onwards, several
planters from Natchitoches – most of them French-speaking Creole residents
– directly petitioned the territorial government of Louisiana for this purpose.
Some of the petitioners had previously engaged in ineffective inter-personal
negotiations with the military authorities of Nacogdoches. For instance, one
of them, André Rambien, had first sent his son-in-law, Michel Chamard, to
Nacogdoches to negotiate for the return of 19-year-old Louis, who had
absconded from Natchitoches in July 1807. As in Guiana, the planters attempted
to pressure the territorial government of Louisiana into exerting its influence to
conclude an agreement with Spanish representatives in Texas, for either the
delivery of the slaves or financial compensation. For instance, settler Marie-
Louise Rouquier requested 1000 piastres (the word used by most French-speak-
ing colonists in Louisiana to designate a US dollar at the time) for 35-year-old
Narcisse, a man who had deserted in September 1807, along with 30 piastres
per month for the net economic loss due to his flight.89 Yet no records exist
suggesting that these petitions did indeed bear fruit. As state governments
seemed unable or unwilling to conclude an agreement on the return of
escaped slaves, slaveowners began contemplating other means of action. For
example, those in western Louisiana favoured the use of armed force to
kidnap escaped slaves.
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Again, as in the Essequibo–Venezuela borderland, some Euro-American set-
tlers hired native Americans (especially Caddoes, Choctaws and Coushattas) to
abduct ‘runaways’ in eastern Texas. Both groups maintained strong commercial
and political ties, exactly as on the Spanish side of the Sabine River. For instance,
three enslaved asylum-seekers living in Nacogdoches requested their relocation
to Trinidad de Salcedo or San Antonio de Béxar in April 1808, arguing that some
indios commissioned by their owners with ‘large offers’might otherwise come to
capture them. Whether their fear was grounded or not, the threat seemed plaus-
ible enough for Nemesio Salcedo to transfer the three petitioners to the villa of
Trinidad.90
At times, planters also endeavoured to abduct escaped slaves in Texas them-
selves by organising armed expeditions. Although these borderland raids were
rare, small detachments of slave hunters commissioned by western Louisiana
residents occasionally roamed eastern Texas looking for fugitives. For instance,
in March 1812, two men named Paterson and McLunamhan reached San
Marcos de Neve, where they abducted two fugitives named Abraham and
Bill.91 Besides, the threat of violent invasion was frequently used as a bargaining
chip. Following the escape of about 30 slaves from Natchitoches in October
1808, planters contemplated sending 200 armed men to Trinidad de Salcedo,
as they expressed a lack of trust in their state and federal governments to act
for their interests.92 In this context, the territorial government grew concerned
about the loyalty to the US of northwestern Louisiana’s planters and urged
federal authorities to arrange the return of escaped slaves in Texas.93 In addition
to pressures exerted from below by angry Louisiana planters, the Spanish agents
in Texas faced threats of overt conflict by the Louisiana territorial government
should Texas fail to revise its asylum policy on foreign escaped slaves.94
While in the end US planters got their way, it was only because of reasons
related to the stability of the Spanish empire. Despite increasing tensions, the
political authorities on both banks of the Sabine River always maintained an
extensive correspondence on the subject of restitution. In March 1808,
Nemesio Salcedo made clear to Claiborne that he was not entirely opposed to
restoring US fugitive slaves. However, he had a condition: in case of a future
ruling by the Spanish Crown favouring freedom to foreign ‘runaways’, Louisiana
would have to send the slaves back to Texas – a condition that Claiborne found
‘wholly unadmissible [sic]’. As a result, their correspondence on the issue lapsed
for some months.95 Yet by November 1808, Claiborne had underlined to sec-
retary of state Madison his belief that – given the current crisis of the Spanish
monarchy after the King’s forced abdication – Spain’s agents in Texas would
be inclined to ignore free-soil policies and take the initiative to deliver foreign
escaped slaves out of a concern to maintain peaceful relations with the US.96
Claiborne proved right as Salcedo agreed on 18 November 1808 to restore
fugitive slaves (without any royal backing), provided that their masters could
document their property rights, and on the condition that the fugitives would
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not be injured when returning to Louisiana.97 Military commandants in Nacog-
doches and Trinidad de Salcedo received instructions regarding restitution: the
idea was to transfer the freedom-seekers in several groups of 15 individuals in
order to prevent the possibility of a large collective revolt, while potential
rebels could be identified. In Nacogdoches, ‘Jacques’ and ‘Julian’ were described
as the leaders of the local escaped slaves community, while in Trinidad de
Salcedo, the mulato ‘Remigio’ was designated as the caudillo of ‘seventeen of
the last fugitives’. Regardless, some asylum-seekers did resist restitution. In Tri-
nidad de Salcedo, Jean-Louis and Marguerite absconded from the guards by
riding a horse and a mare, crossing the Brazos River and following a southward
route to La Bahía del Espíritu Santo.98 Despite such spontaneous acts of resist-
ance, officer Pedro López Prieto in Trinidad deported 41 escaped slaves to
Nacogdoches for their restitution to Louisiana between January and February
1809, while 14 others were jailed awaiting expulsion.99 Claiborne interpreted
the decision as evidence of New Spain’s ‘friendly disposition’, and instructed
parish judges across Louisiana in May 1809 to ensure that ‘an entire pardon
of the offence of Desertion’ was granted to the fugitives who ‘were lately deliver’d
[sic] to their owners’.100
The accord between the Spanish side and Louisiana on escaped slaves was
effective for some months.101 Yet, on 7 August 1809, Salcedo unexpectedly
rescinded the restitution policy after receiving instructions from the Junta
Central in Spain, and Spanish Texas once again welcomed foreign slaves
escaping from the US, though the restitution agreement continued to be
held as an argument in discussions on enslaved asylum-seekers in the
Texas–Louisiana borderlands after its repeal.102 In November 1811, Claiborne
attempted to revive it, when requesting the delivery of two fugitive slaves by
reminding the Spanish side of the ‘amicable arrangements’ concluded some
years before. Likewise, in February 1812, John C. Carr backed a woman’s
request for the return of the fugitives Jean-Louis and Marguerite, and
argued that ‘in consequence of this order, the whole of the slaves with the
exception of those of the unfortunate widow Besson were delivered to their
masters’, as both had escaped from the restitution caravan.103 In this particu-
lar case, a compromise was eventually found between both parties, even
though the accord was not re-implemented. Through the mediation of Nacog-
doches settler Pedro Samuel Davenport and in exchange for 10 pesos, the
couple was eventually brought back to Natchitoches, years after they had
found refuge in eastern Texas.104
Concluding comparisons
Both the Essequibo–Venezuela and the Louisiana–Texas contact zones experi-
enced a relatively incomplete transition from borderlands to bordered lands.
While a clear boundary between Louisiana and Texas was reached only in
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1819, the border line between present-day Guyana and Venezuela still remains
contentious. The lack of clarity of imperial boundaries went in hand with rela-
tively loose territorial controls. In this context, self-liberated African slaves took
advantage of inter-imperial rivalries for their own emancipation, in particular
after the Royal Decree of 1750. Yet prospects of formal freedom in the
Spanish empire could prove delusory, as local administrators regularly
ignored, dismissed or disobeyed the sometimes contradictory set of instructions
regarding free soil.
The unevenness of the dynamics of colonisation, economic expansion, and
empire-building on both sides of the borderlands influenced the Spanish
side’s colonial management of Dutch and US fugitive slaves as refugees. In the
Essequibo–Venezuela borderland, the Spanish side gradually acquired strength.
While negotiation was necessary until the early eighteenth century, afterwards
the Spanish saw less need to accommodate Dutch desires to return runaways
or provide financial compensation. In addition, opportunities for escape
increased for the enslaved, as the Amerindians progressively retreated from
the contact zone, clearing the routes for escape to the Orinoco region. By con-
trast, an opposite trend animated Spanish Texas. Mounting pressure from plan-
ters from Louisiana combined with expansionist US views over the province,
increased border tensions, eventually forcing Texas into restitution. The fate
of escaped slaves in the edges of the Spanish empire, therefore, rested largely
on day-to-day improvisation by local administrators, as unconditional protec-
tion would endanger an always-fragile equilibrium between competing states
in the borderlands. Spain’s colonial agents navigated in a continuum between
confrontation and cooperation depending on relative geopolitical strength,
foreign slaveholders’ aggressiveness, and the will to prevent and de-escalate
border conflicts. In the midst of European polities, Amerindians acted as influ-
ential middle-men through their leverage as ad hoc slave hunters, like the Caribs
in the Essequibo–Venezuela borderland.
In their efforts to retrieve ‘runaways’, planters employed various methods,
ranging from legal to illegal. States and private citizens occasionally negotiated
the restitution of ‘runaways’ or financial compensations. In the Essequibo–
Orinoco zone, agreements between local governors collapsed and prompted
the demand for a ‘cartel’ between states. In the more troubled Louisiana–
Texas borderland, planters and slave hunters regularly launched (or threatened
to launch) armed raids. As a result, while in the Orinoco region no substantial
territorial threat compelled the Spanish agents to deliver ‘runaways’, the agents
of Spain in Texas felt under increasing pressure from the east.
The respective motives for the restitution agreements of 1791 (in Essequibo–
Venezuela) and 1808 (in Louisiana–Texas) diverge accordingly. For the former
case, the decision was part of a larger closing of asylum policy for slaves from
Dutch colonies and a reaction to the circulation of the news of the French revo-
lution in the Atlantic world. For the latter case, by contrast, the local restitution
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agreement passed between Nemesio Salcedo and governor Claiborne directly
resulted from increasing local border conflicts over fugitive slaves and a
related concern over Spanish sovereignty in northeastern New Spain. After
years of consistent free-soil policy, the agents of the Spanish empire in Texas
were eventually forced to adopt a more compliant attitude towards the opposite
side than their counterparts in the Orinoco region. Consequently, the conditions
of enforcement of sanctuary policy from the Spanish side in Texas and Vene-
zuela varied according to their respective perceptions of local balances of
power. As such, both cases illustrate the contingency of empire-building in
the early modern Americas, and the precarious nature of freedom for refugees
from slavery in the Spanish possessions.
Freedom for escaped slaves settled in Spanish Texas and Venezuela thus
remained highly contingent, and flight across borders was a double-edged
sword with often-unpredictable consequences for absconders. Their status as
asylum-seekers on the fringes of the Spanish empire was never fully secured,
as the shared story of Spanish colonial administrators and Dutch/US escaped
slaves was primarily a story of imperial interests. Even during the years when
free-soil applied, the prospect of re-enslavement or deportation still hung over
their heads, in the form of slaveowners’ legal or illegal incursions, Amerindians
acting as unofficial slave patrols, or Spanish military commandants’ shifting atti-
tudes on amparo (protection).
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